Abstract-This paper details the design of an autonomous vehicle CAD toolchain, which captures formal descriptions of driving scenarios in order to develop a safety case for an autonomous vehicle (AV). Rather than focus on a particular component of the AV, like adaptive cruise control, the toolchain models the end-to-end dynamics of the AV in a formal way suitable for testing and verification. First, a domain-specific language capable of describing the scenarios that occur in the day-to-day operation of an AV is defined. The language allows the description and composition of traffic participants (e.g., other vehicles and traffic control devices), and the specification of formal correctness requirements. A scenario described in this language is an executable that can be processed by a specification-guided automated test generator (bug hunting), and by an exhaustive reachability tool. The toolchain allows the user to exploit and integrate the strengths of both testing and reachability, in a way not possible when each is run alone. Finally, given a particular execution of the scenario that violates the requirements, a visualization tool can display this counter-example and generate labeled sensor data. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated on three autonomous driving scenarios drawn from a collection of 36 scenarios that account for over 95% of accidents nationwide. These case studies demonstrate robustness-guided verification heuristics to reduce analysis time, counterexample visualization for identifying controller bugs in both the discrete decision logic and low-level analog (continuous) dynamics, and identification of modeling errors (e.g., traffic behaviors) that lead to unrealistic environment behavior.
Introduction
What type of evidence should we require before giving a driver's license to an autonomous vehicle? To answer this question, consider the major components which make up an AV. An AV is typically equipped with multiple sensors, such as a LIDAR (a laser range finder) and several cameras. The readings of these sensors are processed by algorithms that extract a model of the current scene in order to understand constraints and context, colloquially, who's doing what and where. This information is then fused together to provide the AV with its state estimate, data such as position and velocity, and that of the other agents in the scene. The AV must then decide where to go next (a decision taken by the behavioral planner component of the control stack), what trajectory to follow to get there (a computation performed by the trajectory planner) and how to actuate steering and acceleration to follow that trajectory (performed by the trajectory tracker). Add to this the interaction with other vehicles and the respect of traffic laws, and it is clear that verifying correctness of AV control is a gargantuan task.
The Electronic Design Automation (EDA) industry has a long history of successfully managing the complexity of semiconductor development by providing tools that enable easy design entry, modular design, abstraction, formal equivalency checking between abstractions, automated test generation, formal verification, and the re-use of tests and other artifacts across abstractions. Most of these techniques are applicable to the development of AVs, by utilizing an integrated approach which deploys the appropriate tools as a coherent and traceable whole.
The novelty of the AV domain is that AVs need to operate in a variety of scenarios (e.g., highway driving vs. parking), and will execute different controllers depending on the scenario, Thus, the AV must be verified in representative scenarios. Each scenario may have an infinite variety of instantiations (highways with different curvatures, intersections with different traffic signage); therefore, it is important to obtain good coverage of a given scenario. The space to be covered includes road varieties and the set of initial states of all agents involved (AVs and human drivers). Safety-criticality implies that coverage must be rigorously measured or bounded, rather than let it be set by an arbitrary timeout on the duration of verification. Thus a formal description of scenarios is needed, suitable for processing by formal testing and reachability tools. The supported testing and reachability tools must be able to handle the cyber-physical nature of AVs, as they combine vehicle dynamics, constraints imposed by road geometry, traffic laws, discrete supervisory logic, and uncertainty regarding the environment.
Contributions. The toolchain proposed in this paper, AVCAD, addresses this need. It provides a scenario description language (SDL) to create driving scenarios with different numbers of agents and on different road topologies (Figure 1 Panel 1) . It also enables the specification of formal correctness requiements in Metric Temporal Logic [10] , a rich specification language similar to SystemVerilog Assertions. The toolchain comes pre-loaded with five driving scenarios, drawn from the 2007 NHTSA accident analysis [14] . The executable scenarios (Figure 1 Panel 2) are automatically passed to two verification tools: S-TALIRO [4] and dReach [9] . S-TALIRO is a specification-guided automatic test generation tool for cyber-physical systems. It can find many different ways in which the AV might violate the specification, thus promoting good coverage of the test space. dReach is a formal verification tool that can exhausively determine whether a hybrid dynamical system violates its specification (Figure 1 Panel 4) . However, it can only handle smaller-scale scenarios than S-TALIRO. Thus the two tools are complementary elements of a practical AV verification and testing methodology. AVCAD also enables a mixed testing-reachability approach, in which testing results guide the reachability analysis and reduce its runtime. Finally, the counter-examples can be visualized in a photorealistic environment (Figure 1 Panel 5) aiding in the debugging process and enabling the generation of synthetic camerabased sensor outputs.
Outline. Section 2 motivates the use of robustness met- 
Background and Related Work
The guidance issued by NHTSA on the elements of a safety assurance case for AVs [15] is a starting point for standardizing the type of safety and correctness evidence needed for deployment of AVs. However, it does not prescribe how such evidence should be obtained, nor at which point of the design cycle analysis should be performed. Our starting point for the development of AVCAD is that AV correctness (including safety) is a spectrum: i.e., we should be able to order vehicles according to how safe they are relative to each other, and compare one AV's performance across different scenarios. This is routinely done for humandriven cars, which receive safety ratings based, for example, regarding their crash performance. For AVs, such a continuous measure of correctness can and should be obtained at design time, and measured throughout the design cycle as the vehicle model is refined and as more components are implemented in hardware. Moreover, it is not just a measure of safety, but more generally a measure of how robustly the AV satisfies potentially complicated requirements.
To understand the approach, consider the T-Junction scenario in Fig. 2 . The ego-vehicle, which is the AV under test, must make a right turn while satisfying the following requirements. 1) At all times, stay at least 2m from any fixed obstacle. 2) If the ego-vehicle is already in the intersection and the approaching vehicle from the left is closer than 3m, reach a speed of 25mph within 6 sec. 3) Either reach the green rectangle within 1min or stay at the starting position until the road is clear.
These requirements increase in complexity: the first is a static no-collision requirement, the second adds a reactive time-constrained element, and the third adds a pure temporal element. What are meaningful continuous measures of correctness for these three requirements? For Req. 1, a meaningful measure ρ would be the minimum distance between the vehicle and any fixed obstacle over the course of the simulation. For Req. 2, things are more complicated because of the two possibilities. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to say that the correctness measure ρ in this case equals either the minimum distance between the two cars if it is above 3m (so the minimum speed requirement is irrelevant), otherwise it equals the difference between the maximum car speed and 25mph over the 6sec window. Intuitively, in the first case the correctness measure indicates how close the other car actually got to colliding, while in the second case what's important is whether the ego-vehicle reacted correctly, and this is measured by how fast it actually got above the minimum threshold of 25mph.
What about the third requirement? The analysis becomes more complicated because of the temporal 'until' component: should the correctness measure reward entering the intersection earlier? Should it differentiate between two different behaviors after the road clears? And what if all three requirements are part of the vehicle specification? How do we balance between all of them? It becomes clear that we need a systematic way of calculating this correctness measure for arbitrary specifications involving reactive, spatio-temporal requirements. Such a systematic measure of correctness is provided by the robustness function of Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) requirements [10] . Specifically, AVCAD allows the user to express the requirements as a formula ϕ in MTL, which is a formal mathematical language for writing temporal specifications. It can be thought of as a special case of SystemVerilog Assertions. AVCAD then invokes the tool S-TALIRO to compute the robustness ρ ϕ (x) of the MTL specification ϕ relative to a given system execution x. The robustness ρ ϕ (x) is a real number that measures two things [6] : its sign tells whether x satisfies the spec (ρ ϕ (x) > 0) or violates it (ρ ϕ (x) < 0). Moreover, the trajectory x can be disturbed by an amount |ρ ϕ (x)| without changing its truth value (e.g., if it is correct, the disturbed trajectory is also correct). Thus, robustness is a continuous measure of correctness of the AV with the desired properties.
Other approaches such as theorem proving [11] , [12] , [20] , verification [2] , [8] , [21] , and synthesis [5] , [13] , [23] also address the safety of autonomous vehicles. The authors of [11] , [12] , [20] all demonstrate the use of theorem proving for AV safety. The drawback of the approach is that all such techniques require human input and abstract models, limiting the scalability. Additionally, existing work such as [12] only considers scenarios involving straight roads and utilizes very conservative lemmas (such as, vehicle spacing of at least 291 feet) [19] . In [1] the authors solve the reachability problem online in order to verify online operation of the AV. In our previous work [16] we also consider scenario-based approaches and the use of reachability analysis to verify AV controllers. In contrast this work builds a larger library of scenarios with multiple dynamic agents, adds realistic road geometries, introduces a flexible scenario description language, and integrates specification-guide testing with exhaustive reachability analysis. Finally, other works [5] , [13] , [23] address the synthesis of AV controllers from formal specifications. This orthogonal attack largely addresses design at the behavior level only, and when composed with the complete system often must still be verified.
Scenario Description Language
The Scenario Description Language (SDL) allows the user to quickly specify a driving scenario with the following components. A scenario S consists of a set of agents, A, that includes the ego-vehicle and other vehicles and the road, a set of traffic laws L, a goal Φ to be achieved by the egovehicle in this scenario, exit conditions E that define when a scenario is over (otherwise the verification tools might not know when to terminate), and a set of initial states Init that captures the initial states of all vehicle agents.
Rather than define these formally, it is best to illustrate them using the T-Junction scenario from the AVCAD library depicted in Fig. 2 . Agents (A): There are 3 agents: the ego-vehicle (a 1 ), environment-vehicle (a 2 ), and the road (a 3 ). See also Section 3.1. It is unrealistic to assume perfect knowledge of the environment vehicle's intentions and dynamics. Thus, the latter must be modeled nondeterministically, e.g.
Roads are described as finitely-parameterized curves: e.g., straight lines (with parameter: length) and cubic splines (parameters: length, curvatures). Thus when the scenario is verified, the results are applicable to all modeled behaviors of the environment vehicles and roads, not just one arbitrarily fixed behavior or road. Law Set (L): The laws are fixed in a given scenario and expressed in Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [10] . In Fig. 2 , one law imposes a speed limit of 50 over for the duration T of the scenario:
The goal Φ of the ego vehicle is always of the form "Ego must reach some region within N time units". In Fig. 2 , the goal region is the green rectangle, expressing that the vehicle should turn onto the main road within some bounded time horizon. Initialization (Init): An AV estimates its state x 0 to within some bounded error (because of measurement imprecision), and so it only knows that x 0 is in some set Init a . Thus, it is necessary at verification time to verify that whatever actual value x 0 has in Init a , the scenario will not lead to a collision or to a requirement violation. The set Init is the product of all vehicles' initial sets: Init = Π a∈A Init a . The initial sets of the 2 cars are shown in light grey in Fig. 2 . Exit Condition (E): Finally, the scenario ends either when the ego vehicle leaves the region defined by the T-Junction (the green region in Fig. 2 ) and proceeds to the next navigation task, or a timeout occurs (the red region in Fig. 2) . The SDL enables the user to describe these elements of a scenario in a consistent and structured manner, and handles many low-level details like maintaining a global clock, monitoring for important events like scenario end, type and dimensionality checking, and sharing of variables to model one AV perceiving another (e.g., the gap sensor of Fig. 2 ). The SDL also relieves the user from initially having to create an AV model by providing one by default, described next.
AV Control and Planning
When the user creates an ego-vehicle agent, the latter is modeled as having the hierarchical control stack developed in [7] , [22] and shown in Fig. 3 (bottom) . This architecture is common, but others have also been proposed. All testing and reachability results apply to this model, briefly described here, with more details in [16] .
In this architecture, the Behavioral Planner (BP) implements the discrete decision logic needed, for example, to decide when to change lanes or come to a stop. The Trajectory Planner (TP) computes reference paths (parameterized by curvature and valid up to a maximum velocity) to be followed by the vehicle to get from its current state x init to its next goal state x goal (which includes the next waypoint produced by the BP). AVCAD implements a TP that was tested on a real vehicle [16] . The Trajectory Tracker (TT) computes acceleration and steering rate to make the vehicle follow the reference trajectory computed by the TP using the dynamics in [18] . Note that AVCAD agents are extensible: for example, a user may extend an AVCAD agent by incorporating alternate controllers, changing the behavioral controller logic, or the cost function of the TP.
To perform rigorous reachability analysis on the scenario, AVCAD uses a formal internal representation of the the agents in the scenario, i.e. a representation with unambiguous mathematical semantics. While several AV simulators exist with richer models than presented above, the fact that they lack this internal formal representation means that it is not possible to run any formal tools on them. Agents in AVCAD have both discrete switching dynamics in the BP and continuous dynamics in the TP and TT. Thus the appropriate formal model is the hybrid automaton [3] . Every agent in an AVCAD scenario is modeled as a hybrid automaton, and the overall scenario model is the product of all these automata, as shown in Fig. 3 . Due to lack of space, we refer the reader to the references for details.
Verification Engines
AVCAD enables two methods of system verification: testing and exhaustive reachability analysis. In a given scenario, we wish to understand whether there exist conditions, such as initial positions and velocities of all vehicles, and particular curvatures of the road, that lead to a violation of the (MTL) requirement ϕ. Denote these conditions collectively by x 0 . Clearly, x 0 can be anything in some pre-determined set X 0 . E.g. the initial velocities of the vehicles approaching an intersection is assumed to be between 0 and 30mph. The purpose of the following two verification tools, S-TALIRO and dReach, is to answer the question: does there exist an initial state x 0 ∈ X 0 s.t. the system's behavior from x 0 violates ϕ?
AVCAD translates the scenario to a format that can be processed by S-TALIRO [4] . S-TALIRO is a tool for automatic test generation for Cyber-Physical Systems. S-TALIRO searches X 0 for an x 0 that yields a trajectory x of minimum robustness ρ ϕ (x). If ρ ϕ (x) is negative, then x is actually a requirement violation. The results are then returned to the designer to visualize and debug. If a violating x 0 exists, then S-TALIRO will find it in the long run with probability approaching 1. In practice, S-TALIRO can find errors quickly, as will be shown in the experiments. It is important to stress that the complexity and hybrid nature of an AV scenario requires testing tools, like S-TALIRO, that go beyond traditional testing for software. Moreover, as explained in Section 2, S-TALIRO computes the robustness of the scenario, which allows us to estimate how badly a requirement is violated (or how well it is satisfied).
AVCAD also translates the scenario to a format that can be processed by dReach [9] , which answers the verification question exhaustively. Namely: if dReach returns that the scenario is SAFE, then it is indeed safe, and if it returns that it is δ-UNSAFE, it provides an example of a violation for debugging. So unlike S-TALIRO, which might be interrupted before finding a violation that does exist, dReach's answer is definitive, but it usually runs for much longer.
The properties of the testing and exhaustive verification methodologies described above are complementary; thus, a scalable CAD system for AVs should leverage their individual strengths where applicable. AVCAD enables heuristics that leverage the results of robustness-guided testing from S-TALIRO to guide dReach. For instance, regions of the state space that have low robustness relative to the specification ϕ are good candidates for exhaustive analysis. Instead of feed- ing the full initial set X 0 to dReach, a smaller sub-region of it, around the initial state of a low-robustness trajectory, is fed to dReach, potentially finding elusive counter-examples faster.
Case Studies and Performance
Consider a trip taken by an AV: it begins by navigating a one way residential road, turning onto an arterial road at a T-Junction (Figure 4) , then negotiates an on-ramp for a highway ( Figure 5 ), eventually switching lanes to overtake another vehicle. This section details the analysis of the AV control and decision system for each scenario, and shows the complementary nature of specification-guided testing and reachability analysis. Each scenario is written in the AVCAD SDL and analyzed using the toolchain.
Under-constrained Environment Dynamics
The first example presented utilizes the T-Junction scenario. This case study illustrates the challenges of modeling the environment vehicles without being overly restrictive or overly permissive. Specifically, it reveals that the nondeterministic dynamics of the environment vehicle were under-constrained, allowing it to rear-end the ego-vehicle. In order to demonstrate the capabilities of AVCAD we return to the running example of the T-Junction scenario. The specification guided testing engine reveals a collision, which can be traced back to the dynamics of env: the latter could accelerate behind ego and rear-end it. In an accident of this nature, the liability always falls on the trailing vehicle's operator.
This undesirable behavior can be excised in two ways: either env dynamics are constrained to disallow this. Or, the scenario automaton (which is the composition of all agents' hybrid automata) is given a new exit condition, which is triggered precisely when env displays such unreasonable behavior. In this case new exit conditions are defined to suppress these false positivies. Fig. 7 shows sampled robustness values as a function of the initial environment vehicle position and velocity. The figure illustrates that incorrect behavior (yellow-to-red dots) are interspersed in-between correct behavior (green dots). Thus testing of complex systems cannot simply be a matter of testing the so-called corner cases. In contrast, the specification-guided testing methodology incorporated in S-TALIRO is able to efficiently identify such failure modes.
Upon applying new exit conditions another failure mode is identified by S-TALIRO. In this case ego fails to yield to an accelerating vehicle (visualization examples are included in [17] ). While dReach is also capable of identifying this failure mode in approximately 84 seconds (Table 1  3 d column); S-TALIRO is capable of producing many concrete variations of the crash in only 8 seconds. In order to correct this failure, the guard in Pause is refined to ensure that the environment vehicle's speed is low enough, and there is a large enough gap that the ego-vehicle has time to complete the maneuver. Upon correcting this problem, dReach exhaustively verified the scenario to be SAFE in 41.98 seconds ( ditionally, dReach certified the scenario as SAFE even with added uncertainty in env's initial set and non-determinism in its dynamics, and with added uncertainty in the egovehicle's perception (Table 1 last column).
Adapting Controllers Between Scenarios
The second scenario investigate is a highway merge maneuver, which adds complexity due to the nature of on-ramp road geometry. This scenario illustrates the complexities of adapting controllers that work in one scenario to a different, seemingly similar, scenario. This motivates the development of CAD toolchains, like AVCAD, to ease the creation of scenarios and analyze them from multiple perspectives. It also illustrates how fast semi-formal testing can help flush out many bugs quickly, thus complementing slow reachability analysis, which is used to certify it as bugfree (or to find corner case bugs that only reachability can find). The ACC design shown in Fig. 8 has been utilized extensively on real vehicles, but is designed for operating conditions involving highway driving tasks with straight roads. Initial testing on the on-ramp indicates that it produces oscillating reference velocity profiles, because it switches frequently between Headway Control and Speed Control. This makes it difficult for the ego-vehicle to track the reference trajectory, particularly on short on-ramps where road curvature is high. Robust testing in S-TALIRO was able to quickly identify that the design was flawed within 8 seconds. In contrast, dReach also returned δ-UNSAFE, but ran for 5+ hours. Additionally, if a safe design for the entire initial set Init Σ proves to be unrealizable, robust testing can quickly identify potential safe sub-regions. Namely, consider Fig. 9 . It shows the robustness of system trajetories as a function of the initial velocity of env, the goal region of ego, and the x-coordinate of env. In Fig. 9 sample points denoted by green spheres are safe. Fig. 9 suggests that the system is robust on longer ramps (Initial ego goal between 39 and 50 meters). dReach is able to prove that this region of the scenario (with full width intervals on all other state variables) is safe in about 3 minutes. This approach is useful because it can precisely answer regulatory questions such as: under what conditions is the system safe to operate?
Controller Gain Error
The last scenario involves a highly parameterized driving task capable of covering most modern highway designs. This scenario demonstrates how AVCAD enables a search for violations over road topologies and geometries in order to identify design flaws in the continuous control of the vehicle. This capability is important since the tracking controllers in this domain generally make strong assumptions about the reference trajectory properties and do not investigate the influence of dynamic obstacles. Vehicle controller gains are often tuned in the field or simulation after the structure of the controllers has been determined; the original control engineers are not always involved. Defensive code should include assertions regarding the parameter selection, but in practice such guidelines may be ignored, or a fast direct design procedure may not exist. S-TALIRO was used to search for specification violations over all possible curvatures of the highway in a pre-fixed interval. In the case of the hybrid ACC low gains on the headway controller combined with a straight line estimate of the headway R caused the ego-vehicle to undershoot the target acceleration and rear end one of the environment vehicles at a road curvature of 100 (m).
SCENARIO 3 (HIGHWAY
The design was adjusted, increasing the proportional gain of the headway controller and the desired headway time, then the system retested. Over the course of 10,000 runs no counterexamples were found. Fig. 11 summarizes the results (where the axes are: Environment Vehicle 1 Velocity, Road Radius, and Environment Vehicle 2 Velocity). Quantitatively, all sampled trajectories resulted in the egovehicle maintaining at least 5.5 m of separation from the other cars. The narrow range of the normalized robutness indicates low variance in vehicle spacing performance.
Conclusions
Because the operation of an AV involves components from very different domains, verifying its correctness will necessitate the deployment of tools from different disciplines. In this work we demonstrate how a combination of robust testing and reachability analysis can lead to the uncovering of bugs in both the continuous and discrete aspects of the AV controller, as well as modelling errors in the description of uncontrollable agents. Once the bugs are addressed we show several cases where reachability analysis can verify that the system meets the specification. The key is to integrate these tools in a coherent toolchain, in a manner similar to CAD toolchains in semiconductor industry. AVCAD is one such toolchain, integrating a scenario description language, executable scenarios, testing and reachability tools, and rich counter-example visualization. Moreover, the toolchain proposed in this paper provides capabilities which can continue to validate specifications via blackbox testing as the design evolves from formal modeling and analysis to implementation. As current tools reveal new errors and hit their limitations, AVCAD forms the basis for an extensible CAD toolset for correctness verification of AVs.
